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The most prominent actor in the 1989 transformation of Eastern 
Europe has been the intelligentsia, a class whose basis for power is its 
control over a special form of teleological knowledge, and a culturally 
constituted group whose claim to authority is its historic role as leaders 
of East European nations. 2 In the wake of revolution they have in most 
places replaced the communist party and won political authority. In 
this article I explain the process through which the intelligentsia has 
apparently come to power, the character of its authority made in 
struggle, and what alternative futures post-communism might have for 
the prospects of the intelligentsia. 
The commonality of the intelligentsia's authority suggests a powerful 
and common structure at work in communism's fall. I argue that there 
is indeed such a deep structure of antagonism between the intelligentsia 
and the Soviet-type system on the one hand, and considerable deter- 
minism in the initial shape of post-communism on the other. But to lose 
sight of the contingencies shaping the transition itself would suggest a 
determinism in process that is analytically, it not also empirically, in- 
defensible. 
The intelligentsia's ascension depended on the possibilities of a nego- 
tiated settlement between it and reformers in the communist party, 
which itself depended on the at least implicit acceptance by the popular 
classes of the intelligentsia's representation. The intelligentsia won this 
authority by becoming spokespersons for a new universalism, civil 
society. But this civil society contained several possible meanings, and 
excluded many significant questions from its conceptualization. The 
future of post-communist systems depends on how civil society's con- 
tradictions and exclusions are worked out as conflicts within and about 
the intelligentsia and its efforts to legislate a new society rage. 
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Because this story continues to unfold in ways too difficult to anticipate 
with any confidence, I focus this essay on the period leading up to the 
formation of post-communist regimes. I discuss how the Polish intelli- 
gentsia's immersion in civil society contributed to the emergence of 
Solidarity in 1980-81 as a cross-class movement identifying with plu- 
ralism, equality, and self-management. I then turn to the difference be- 
tween Poland and Hungary, emphasizing not only social conditions but 
also the different legacies of opposition to the Soviet-type system in 
these two societies. I subsequently discuss how the Hungarian intelli- 
gentsia created its own civil society, and illustrate that with reference to 
two forms of self-organization based on the intelligentsia itself. Next I 
compare both countries' transition to post-communism, emphasizing 
above all the negotiations that occurred in them between communist 
reformers and the intelligentsia as representatives of civil society. In 
both countries, I discuss the appearance of an intelligentsia that has 
come to power, but argue rather that this intelligentsia has used its 
power to elevate the authority of markets, and thereby legislate a new 
system that tranforms and undermines the very basis for its class 
power. Before I turn to the question of the intelligentsia and these spe- 
cific comparisons, I discuss briefly the place of Poland and Hungary in 
East European transition in order to suggest why they deserve analyti- 
cal priority. 
Eastern Europe and the intelligentsia in the Soviet-type system 
Perestroika was of course the necessary condition for systematic trans- 
formation in Eastern Europe, but it was itself moved by the experi- 
ences of Poland and Hungary. Hungary was observed closely by Soviet 
authorities as a model for communism's economic transformation. 
Poland was also being watched, if with a less admiring eye. General 
Jaruzelski's failure to restore economic and political order without 
Solidarity meant that the Soviets were facing few options in Poland at 
the end of the 1980s other than invasion or emancipation. The relative 
costs of the invasion and withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan prob- 
ably suggested to many Soviet leaders that emancipation would cost 
the U.S.S.R. far less than occupation. Poland and Hungary are thus 
important because these places more than the others are the ones that 
moved the tranformation of all Soviet-type societies. 
No one anticipated how quickly the transformation of Eastern Europe 
would take place. Each place deserves its own analysis in this year of 
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revolution, but Poland and Hungary might deserve analytical priority 
for several reasons. First, the dynamics that have established their post- 
communist regimes are the most internally derived. 3 External interven- 
tion and imitations has been least important for the Polish and Hungar- 
ian transitions, while their transitions were critical for moving change in 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and much later, 
Albania. Second, these societies initiated the transitions and were the 
pathbreakers for post-communist tranformation. They tested the limits 
of change in Soviet foreign policy, with Poland's first partially free elec- 
tions, and with Hungary's open border with Austria. Finally, they imply 
two alternatives in post-communist transition, with the Polish tranfor- 
marion having been based on a cross-class alliance in civil society 
against the authorities, and the Hungarian transition depending more 
on a negotiated alliance between Party reformers and opposition intel- 
lectuals. They offer the opportunity for neat comparison, therefore, 
especially so as to explain why the intelligentsia becomes so prominent 
in case of either transition motivated first by negotiation at the top or 
pressure from the bottom, suggesting a measure of determinism the 
suggestion of transition's contingency denies. But before I turn to this 
Polish-Hungarian comparison, I discuss briefly the general situation of 
the intelligentsia in the communist system in order to establish the 
commonality that makes meaningful the contrast of contexts. 
In the absence of a strong bourgeoisie and given the centrality of 
nationalism, East European intellectuals were moved to prominence in 
practical politics before World War II. 4 In several senses, the Soviet- 
type system continued that practice. The Party pretended to be the col- 
lective intellectual, realizing for society and the universal class their 
interests. It also claimed managerial expertise, expressed through cen- 
tralized planning and organizational hegemony, s The intelligentsia and 
the Party both shared an interest in elevating their capacity for teleo- 
logical knowledge to a superior position in the legitimation of surplus's 
distribution. 6 But au tonomous  intellectuals were an anachronism in 
such a system, especially when that system was forced on a resistant 
culture and intellectuals struggled to retain their distinction. 
If the distinction of autonomous intellectuals resides in their capacity 
to redefine their distinction, 7 the Soviet-type system was not their class 
project. Even while the Soviet-type system elevated the intelligentsia by 
eliminating class rivals and promoting a knowledge-based class order, 
it also sought to take away from intellectuals their distinction in the 
name of a supra-individual rationality. Where in other social orders, 
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intellectuals were privileged not only by rank but also by a qualitatively 
separate status based on the distinction they cultivated and elaborated, 
in the new order they were placed on top of a hierarchy that denied 
their qualitative difference. 
Most obviously state censorship denies intellectuals the capacity to de- 
fine their product. Imposed styles, as socialist realism, aim to reduce 
intellectual distinction, but even in more subtle ways, the Soviet-type 
system oppresses this distinction. The idea that intellectuals, as others, 
should serve common interest means that intellectuals are denied the 
privilege of defining their master, a condition especially noxious when 
but for state power other patrons could be sought. Collectivism, even 
one based on some order favorable to the material interests of intel- 
lectuals, works to deny the individualistic foundation that makes the 
intellectual as actor distinctive. As Bahro argued, s the Soviet-type 
system produced "surplus consciousness," where bureaucratic domi- 
nation suppressed the creative capacity of individuals, especially of 
intellectuals. 
This incompatibility between intellectual and Soviet-type system oper- 
ates mainly at the ideological level, however. In fact, in the very attempt 
to control and limit the intellectual's distinction, the system elevated 
the intellectual and her search for "truth." By contrast, the market, with 
its tolerance and embrace of the individual, works to undermine the 
creative project by submitting it to the market and its tyranny, while 
nevertheless creating an image of intellectual freedom. 9 The vision of 
Soviet-type totalitarianism clearly identified the autonomous intellec- 
tual as opponent, thereby moving such an intellectual to prominence in 
opposition and to a natural solidarity with a broader resistance to the 
existing regime. 
The intelligentsia in the tranformation of the Soviet-type system 
Revisionism offered one means by which communist principles could 
have been transformed to make intellectuality and the Soviet-type sys- 
tem compatible, but by 1968 revisionism was defeated as an East 
European project, l° Intellectuals remaining within the system were left 
without an independent tranformative identity aside from their domes- 
tic national one. As such, many of those formerly engaged in the trans- 
formation of the Marxian project were led to search for what their own 
national tradition meant, and to reconstruct it. This became especially 
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important as they sought to distinguish their nationalism from those 
who from communism's imposition rested on traditional nationalism to 
define their opposition. This nationalism had been, after all, the natural 
vehicle for the intelligentsia's opposition to the form of communism 
characterizing the Soviet-type system in Eastern Europe) 1 Commu- 
nism there was an extension of Soviet power, on the one hand, and 
nationalism typically had no inborn animosity to the intellectual, on the 
other. 
Traditional themes in nationalist politics and identity formation gener- 
ally rely on some kind of reaction rather than a positive project of iden- 
tity formation, however. That also means that nationalist projects will 
acquire different expressions in each East European setting. In Poland, 
where Polish etbnicity is claimed by over 95 percent of the population, 
nationalism was most obviously expressed in a continuation of the 
struggles from before World War I with the demand for a truly inde- 
pendent state, this time free of Soviet/Russian/Communist domina- 
tion. 12 Other nationalisms also focused on this state project, but gen- 
erally not in the same way as the Poles whose numerical preponder- 
ance and geographical spread in Eastern Europe encouraged their 
vision of another great state, as they had centuries earlier. The struggle 
for statehood by Croatia and Slovenia are not on the same scale, even if 
they do express something similar: that if only our nation could have its 
own state, it could be great, or even normal, again. 
Like Poland, Hungary also has a stong historical memory of its great 
power status, but unlike Poland, its nationalism does not focus on state 
power. Former Hungarian dissident Mihfily Vajda describes the differ- 
ence: "The independence of the great Polish nation is very important to 
the Poles. It is absolutely unimportant to the Hungarians. National 
consciousness does exist in a lot of respects, but a big and independent 
Hungarian country is not an issue for Hungarians at all." 13 This Hun- 
garian difference seems to be a consequence of the twentieth century's 
lessons. 
The costs of the Soviet invasion of 1956 crushed the appeal of a 
nationalist discourse that focused on the militant struggle for an inde- 
pendent Hungarian state. But even earlier, expansionist and statist 
nationalism was undermined by the results of World War I, when Hun- 
garian territory was radically circumscribed, leaving many Hungarians 
in other states: in Slovakia, in Yugoslavia's Vojvodina, and especially in 
Romania. The results of World War II only reinforced that sense of 
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national dismemberment. With the distribution of the means of vio- 
lence as they are, redrawn state borders and great power status are less 
feasible as a focus for Hungarian nationalism's main aspiration. Con- 
cern over those Hungarian minorities in border states does, however, 
provide nationalism its main theme. 
These nationalisms seem mostly defensive, or at least non-offensive, as 
they are directed primarily against nationalities with greater resources. 
Many of the other East European nationalisms have as a dominant 
theme some kind of threat to minority populations, however. The Serbs 
express their nationalism in the struggle to retain control over their his- 
toric homeland in Kosovo, with the consequent threat against Alba- 
nians. The Romanians and Bulgarians express their nationalism with 
the repression of the cultural rights of their Hungarian and Turkish 
minorities in particular. German nationalism, given its twentieth-centu- 
ry experience, tends to be far more cautious. Instead of longing for the 
reacquistion of now Polish lands, it is much safer to insist upon the 
"naturally" united Germany, even while the rest of Eastern Europe 
most fears this national identity. 
Nevertheless, all of these East European nationalisms contain the 
potential for combining the defensive with the offensive. Although 
there has been an effort within East European civil societies to oppose 
intolerance and especially anti-Semitism, its potential continues to exist 
and only conscious struggle against it seems to work against its revival. 
This conflict, between an chauvinistic nationalism and a universalistic 
one is, in fact, one of the principal struggles defining the post-commu- 
nist epoch, and was one of the tensions the struggle for civil society 
could cover over. 
In the communist system, the struggle for national independence and 
state power could easily define the first kind of opposition. But such a 
nationalism also could be translated into the suppression of others' 
rights, much as its promoters struggled to realize their own. A new 
"universalistic" kind of nationalism, based on the development of civil 
society, was developed under communism in opposition to this older 
form. Rather than assert the rights of one's own nationality over those 
of others, this new kind of nationalism had two key themes: European 
identity and national equality, with each reinforcing the other. 
National equality not only meant that the Soviet empire had no right to 
determine the national futures of the various East European societies, 
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namely that states are of equal stature, but also that state-forming 
nationalities had no right to assert their needs over the needs of other 
nationalities in their own states. Jfinos Kis, for instance, asserted that 
for Hungarians to demand better treatment for their minorities abroad, 
they must also assure the rights of their own minorities, most notably 
GypsiesJ 4 
The European identity was also part of this liberal redefinition of 
national consciousness. To emphasize a nation's European heritage 
was to do two things at once: first, to emphasize the distinction of this 
people from the "Western Asian" Russians, for whom the Soviet-type 
of communism might seem natural or appropriateJ s Second, it was to 
give the nation a broader identity that would allow it to avoid the glori- 
fication of its own singular identity, and rather escalate the principles of 
a liberal and civil society to an element of the national heritage. Indeed, 
rather than cultural peculiarity, this version of nationalist conscious- 
ness emphasized the European, albeit "universal," virtues of human 
rights and civil society. 
Former Polish dissident and present parliamentarian Adam Michnik, ~6 
who certainly would number among proponents of the latter vision, 
named Sacharov in the U.S.S.R., Kis in Hungary, and Havel in Czecho- 
slovakia also as representatives of this tradition. These men were pro- 
moting this vision long before they were vying for national political 
authority. But when they were dissidents, their reconstructions of 
national identity were mostly important for those intellectuals normally 
engaged in the project of cultural debate: political dissidents and hu- 
manistic intellectuals. The mass intelligentsia had only a limited identi- 
fication with this East European legacy. Indeed, the Soviet-type system 
intentionally recreated the region's intelligentsia so as to move such 
questions outside their professional competence and personal prov- 
ince. 
In higher education, the system moved away from the broadly educated 
to the narrowly trained, reducing the numbers of humanists and 
lawyers trained and increasing dramatically the number of engineers. 
The system tried to generate an intelligentsia that shared no cultural 
identity, 17 and rather was a stratum of highly educated, narrowly trai- 
ned specialists, whose professionalism would be promoted so long as 
they avoided the kinds of questions that had preoccupied the East 
European intelligentsia in the past, namely national identity and social 
justiceJ 8 
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As such, the cultural struggle to promote nationalism, or to transform 
national identity into one of a liberal civil society, also was a struggle to 
transform the Soviet-type system's increasingly "professional" intelli- 
gentsia into one more like its traditional East European form. In a 
sense, one could think of this as a struggle of the East European life 
world against the Soviet-type system. 19 But in fact, this cultural struggle 
also could draw upon the system's own internal contradictions when it 
came to professionalism. An anti-systemic identity born in the subordi- 
nation of professionalism to illegitimate political standards and incom- 
petent managerial practices 2° served to make the civil society argument 
appealing even to the apolitical but professionally minded. To rid 
themselves of the incompetent politically appointed bureaucrats would 
allow for professional qualifications to rule the day. 
The only problem, of course, was that these same political appointees 
were the ones who decided professional careers. So, even if sympathet- 
ic, the idea of civil society emerging from within East European com- 
munism had to await social struggles that would make this framework 
for opposition sensible for the mass of professionals to support active- 
ly. Given this dependence on social struggles, the construction of civil 
society as Eastern Europe's emancipatory alternative took different 
courses in different societies. Thus, it is best now to turn to specifics, 
and begin with Poland to see how a civil society based on a national 
cross-class alliance was constructed. 
The intelligentsia's immersion in Polish civil society 
After the debacle of 1968, in which intellectuals and students were iso- 
lated in protest and submitted to anti-intellectual and anti-semitic 
exhortations, imprisonment and exile, workers became Poland's central 
tranformative actors. In late 1970 and early 1971, workers took to the 
streets in mass demonstrations, but this time they were isolated, as 
intellectuals remained quiescent, being both exhausted and resentful of 
their treatment by the working class two and one-half years earlier. But 
the workers' isolation did not prove so disastrous as the intellectuals', as 
they were able to turn out the old Party leadership around Gomtrlka, 
and replace him with Edward Gierek, a technocratic Party leader from 
Silesia. When Gierek would ask workers for help in constructing a new 
Poland, in the beginning workers would respond enthusiastically. 
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Gierek's Poland was based on a new model of growing consumerism, 
greater professionalism, and technocratic ideology. Some intellectuals 
were thus drawn into the Gierek program with promises that their 
expertise would be employed in the construction of the new order. 
Although the communist regime contined to be "alien" to the Polish 
nation, the demands of ideology receded. Few took it seriously, and 
loyalty to the regime came to consist in ritualistic practices and an 
absence of oppositional activity. Much as in Hungary, where Party 
leader Jfinos Kfidfir had said a decade earlier that those who are not 
against us are with us, in Poland the politics of intellectuals came to 
resemble more and more the tradition of "organic work" (praca u 
postaw), where professionalism could take the place of overt political 
activity. The obviousness of this political response began to disappear 
in the mid-1970s, however. 
In 1975, Gierek wanted to demonstrate his loyalty to the Soviet Union 
by introducing changes to the Constitution. He sought to add two par- 
ticularly offensive phrases, one concerning the leading role of Poland's 
communist party in all spheres of social life (rather than the leading 
role of the working class) and the other about unshakeable and frater- 
nal bonds between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. This generated not only a 
considerable intellectual backlash but also a sharp reaction by the 
Catholic Church hierarchy in the persons of Primate Stefan Wyszyliski 
and Cardinal Karol Wojtyla. With this development, the Catholic 
Church began to move away from its cautious relationship to the 
authorities, and to support the political opposition more and more. 21 
By 1977, one of the leaders of the 1968 student demonstrations, Adam 
Michnik, began to argue that the Church and those in the tradition of 
the anti-clerical left have reason for dialogue and common opposition 
to the Polish authorities. Although his Koici6l, Dialog, Lewica (The 
Church, Dialogue, the Left) 22 produced considerable interest within 
Poland, a shorter essay was more consequential. "The New Evolution- 
ism" was one of the first programmatic statements to suggest the course 
Solidarity followed later. 
Michnik argued against the prevailing political legacies of 1956. 23 Both 
revisionism and neopositivism 24 depended on the activities of elites, 
not on mass public pressure. The dependence of both strategies on ini- 
tiation from above thus led them to choose the wrong sides in periods 
of open conflict. The only strategy that might consistently lead to the 
right choice is one based on "an unceasing struggle for reform and evo- 
lution that seeks an expansion of civil liberties and human rights. ''25 
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Michnik concludes, "In searching for truth, or, to quote Leszek Kola- 
kowski, 'by living in dignity', opposition intellectuals are striving not so 
much for a better tomorrow as for a better today. Every act of defiance 
helps us to build the framework of democratic socialism, which should 
not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real day- 
to-day community of free people. ''26 
Michnik's essay helped to lay an intellectual foundation for the Solidar- 
ity movement in Poland. It constructed a program that was unambig- 
uously on the side of society against the authorities, and without possi- 
bility for compromise with them. It therefore represented a form of 
national identification, while not demanding that the rights of Polish 
nationhood be elevated over other peoples. It could not easily be at- 
tacked from any ideological position, especially since most political 
groups at least pay lip service to the idea of human rights. And it prom- 
ised a new universality, one that could eclipse the claims of Marxism. 
Here, human rights were in everyone's interests, serving equally well 
workers, peasants, and intellectuals. But perhaps even more significant 
than the essay, Michnik and other intellectuals formed a group that 
demonstrated in practice what the essay suggested. 
The Committee in Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnik6w 
or KOR) was formed to help those workers and their families victim- 
ized by the authorities after the 1976 strikes and demonstrations. 
These were above all traditional creative intellectuals 27 who put their 
capacities at the service of workers. Not only did they try to raise 
money to help them, but also tried to facilitate directly the self-organi- 
zation of society by advocating independent trade unions through the 
Charter of Workers' Rights. 28 The Solidarity movement, although not a 
product of these intellectuals' efforts alone, 29 was certainly influenced 
by this new image of opposition: civil society against the state. 3° 
This civil society was tied closely, although not entirely, to the Catholic 
Church. Lay Catholic intellectuals, organized in Clubs of Catholic 
Intellectuals, were frequent advisors and contributors to the movement. 
Church premises could be used as meeting places. Religious clerical 
networks connecting pulpits, and therefore congregations, could pro- 
vide a means for communicating a coherent message to a significant 
proportion of Poles. The elevation of Krak6w Archbishop Karol 
Wojtyla to Pope also gave Poles a new charismatic figure with whom to 
identify. His visit to Poland in 1979 was organized by civil society itself, 
without state assistance, thereby providing an important lesson in self- 
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organization. Perhaps equally important, the Pope's language provided 
to Polish citizens a new vocabulary for expressing their resistance to 
the regime. 
The traditional language of liberation had been appropriated by the 
authorities. Words like "socialism," "self-management," and "class 
struggle" compromised those who uttered them. 31 The Pope provided 
instead a language that expressed emancipation in terms of human dig- 
nity, truth, and solidarity. These were words that could be used without 
compromise to express the common interests of civil society against the 
authorities. Pope John Paul II's invectives against the language of class 
struggle in liberation theology reflect this background of struggle 
against Poland's communist authorities. This opposition to Marxist lan- 
guage also had an important function in Polish politics, as class antago- 
nisms were one of the foundations for the reproduction of the commu- 
nist order. 
In Soviet-type systems as elsewhere, workers typically resent intellec- 
tuals' arrogance and privilege, while intellectuals often distrust workers' 
fundamentalist or populist politics. The communist authorities have 
exploited this distrust in their effort to quell any kind of unified opposi- 
tion to them. 32 The idea of civil society, and the terminology of dignity 
and solidarity allowed an escape from this principal barrier to an 
organized civil society. 
The civil society project was also successful in organizing an opposition 
to the Soviet-type system because it contained no substantive politics. 
It said nothing about the distribution of wealth, ownership of the means 
of production, or division of labor. Strategically, it offered a means for 
the construction of cross-class alliances, as intellectuals could offer 
their support in the defense of the civil liberties and human rights of 
those with weaker ties to the media and poorer skills at publicizing 
their oppression. In return, the collective strength of self-organized 
workers could build public pressure on the authorities to respect the 
rights and liberties the intellectuals moved to the public sphere. On this 
foundation, Solidarity could be formed. 
The character of Polish Solidarity 
Solidarity was an alliance of all classes in Polish civil society against the 
state. It was, therefore, more than an alliance of disgruntled workers 
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and dissident historians and journalists. The majority of the broader 
class of intelligentsia also belonged to the union. Although workers 
were far and away the numerical majority of this union, the highly edu- 
cated were overrepresented in the leadership of the movement. And 
even where workers were in the leadership, as Lech Walesa and Zbig- 
niew Bujak, they depended heavily on intellectual advisors like Mich- 
nik, Jacek Kurori, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Bronislaw Geremek? 3 
This was, of course, a workers' movement based on the experiences of 
the working class in Gdafisk, Szczecin, Silesia, and other industrial cen- 
ters, 34 but it also was heavily influenced by the dissident intellectuals 
who promoted the idea of civil society's struggle against the state, 
and by the broader intelligentsia that promoted professionalism over 
politics. 
The two principal classes of urban Solidarity in 1980-81 had different 
emphasis in their politics. Workers were above all interested in a kind 
of radical trade unionism, from a militant defense of local issues to a 
kind of self-managing economic reform based on workers' councils. All 
sectors of society had to be interested in such a trade unionism in the 
beginning because that was the foundation for social transformation. 
But later, as the conflict between authorities and self-organized society 
intensified and economic crisis grew, it became apparent to more and 
more people that some institutional transformation would have to be 
initiated to lead Poland out of the crisis. 
To this point, Solidarity's transformation was above all "social," in that 
it allowed new actors to form and articulate interests. Now, however, 
these actors had to reconstruct the more durable rules and patterned 
distribution of resources that shaped still the interaction of these old 
and new groups. The intelligentsia was more active in promoting this 
institutional reform of economy and politics than workers. For in- 
stance, the self-managing movement called Si~d, or the Network, was 
above all led by engineers and other professionals, even if in alliance 
with workers. Too, the Solidarity Congress in the fall of 1981 was de- 
voted most of all to political issues, and most of the delegates were 
themselves from the intelligentsia. 35 
Although internal politics may have grown more divisive over time, 
Solidarity was characterized by an internal discourse that reproduced 
the unity of the movement. 36 Realizing the importance of the working- 
class base, intellectuals would rarely formulate plans that contradicted 
the workers' egalitarian orientations. For example, the formulation of 
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the self-management project was not justified solely in terms of eco- 
nomic necessity or efficiency, as in isolation engineers may have done, 
but also in terms of democracy. In this sense, self-government as a 
democratic ethos was extended downward to that of the enterprise, as 
intellectuals had moved it upward to the national level. Pluralism also 
remained one of the movement's fundamental values, in terms of the 
alternative order for which Solidarity struggled, but also in terms of the 
struggle itself as each social group was encouraged to form its own 
identity to represent its own interests. Pluralism was thus understood as 
social self-organization, even while fundamental disagreements were 
suppressed in the attempt to preserve the solidarity of civil society 
against the state. An internal pragmatism based on the values of self- 
organization, equality, and self-government enabled Solidarity's acti- 
vists to continue the construction of a cross-class movement. 
This pragmatic cross-class movement had its systemic foundations too. 
By itself, the intelligentsia did not have the social power to effect the 
institutional transformations they sought. They could not end 
nomenklatura, promote greater professionalism, or open the public 
sphere without the pressure brought by the threat of collective action 
by workers in Poland's largest factories. In this sense, the intelligentsia 
was dependent on workers to effect social reconstruction. Thus, the 
discursive reproduction of Solidarity's unity was premised on the 
dependency of intellectuals on working-class power. 37 
This reproduction of movement unity was, admittedly, becoming more 
difficult to realize over the fall of 1981, but it had by no means yet 
failed. Nevertheless, the imposition of martial law on 13 December 
1981 prevented Solidarity's politics from moving in any direction gen- 
erated by the movement's original form. Solidarity's cross-class unity 
had been reproduced pragmatically in an open public sphere. Once 
that sphere was closed, Solidarity became but a symbol, and an ambi- 
guous one at that. 
This experience of an open public sphere in 1980-81 demonstrated to 
most that the defense of civil rights and self-organization could not 
serve as an adequate frame for systemic transformation (as in the econ- 
omy or polity) even if it could generate a marked social transformation 
(as in the formation of new groups to defend civil liberties). When 
debate over institutional change moved to the center, this of necessity 
led to the construction of a more pluralistic Polish opposition, and a 
more pluralistic Polish politics. I shall return to the Polish case later in 
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this essay, but I should turn to the opposition which, by contrast, began 
as a pluralistic body, even if more exclusively intellectual. 
The difference between Poland and Hungary 
The arguments of opposition intellectuals in Eastern Europe reflect 
both the social conditions in which they are constructed as well as the 
legacy of oppositional activity upon which they draw. The difference 
between Hungary and Poland can, perhaps, be most clearly drawn by 
considering why one such argument, Konrfid and Szel6nyi's thesis of 
the intelligentsia as a ruling class in statu nascendi, could be considered 
appropriate to Hungary while unsuitable for Poland. 
At the very time Konrfid and Szet6nyi were writing of the likelihood of 
the political authorities and intelligentsia finding common ground for 
class rule, the Polish intelligentsia was beginning to reconstruct a 
moral/cultural basis for opposition to the communist authorities. 
Indeed, Frentzel-Zagdrska and Zagdrski's critique of Szel6nyi rests on 
such an account that finds no reason to elevate imputed class interests 
above cultural self definition in the explanation of class alliances and 
social conflicts. 38 In Hungary, the constitution of social groups prohib- 
ited the same kind of dichotomous politics of morality as that created 
in Poland. There are three basic sociological reasons for this. 
First, and most obvious, Polish workers have been more militant and 
more organized than any other working class in Soviet-type societies. 
When Michnik could write in 1976 that open social conflict proves 
both revisionists and neo-positivists wrong, intellectuals in other East 
European countries had no basis for expecting such open or protracted 
social conflict. Before 1989, revisionism and especially neo-positivism 
were not strategies that could be thrown on the ash heap of history in 
these other countries. Indeed, while Michnik in 1976 was speaking of 
the importance of a program that could avoid compromise with the 
authorities, over a decade later Jfinos Kis was writing that "the resolu- 
tion of the country's crisis is conceivable only in the form of com- 
promise" 39 
Second, and not unrelated to this first point, the disparity between 
public facade and private disposition among intellectuals has likely 
been greater in Poland than in Hungary, though perhaps not greater 
than that experienced in the early 1960s in Czechoslovakia. 4° The cul- 
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tural gulf between communist authorities and independent intellectuals 
is greater where intellectuals do not practice the politics of revisionism 
or of neopositivism. It is also greater where nationalist traditions are 
posed in overt opposition to the communist regime. 
In the mid to late 1970s in Hungary, some of the most prominent 
opposition intellectuals were students of Lukfics, and were still working 
out their relationship to the Marxist tradition. By contrast in Poland, 
few if any opposition intellectuals accepted Marxism as a primary tra- 
dition by the late 1960s. Where in Poland nationalism was situated in 
revolutionary opposition to the regime, 41 in Hungary the populist tradi- 
tion worked relatively comfortably with the communists through the 
mid 1980s. 42 Indeed, it was not until the mid 1980s in Hungary that a 
group of reformers broke with the establishment to address society 
rather than only official decision makers, 43 whereas in Poland, that 
break had perhaps taken place in 1968 and certainly by 1976. For the 
Hungarian intelligentsia, the field of intellectual politics was not so 
antagonistic as in Poland, and compromise involved in working for the 
regime was not so problematic. 
Third, the Hungarian authorities have been much more skilled at deal- 
ing with intellectuals, especially those in Budapest. They assured more 
space for intellectual independence than the Polish authorities, and 
even when they censored their intellectual opposition, the Hungarian 
authorities were more limited than their Polish comrades. Their attack 
in the early to mid 1970s on independent intellectuals was more selec- 
tive and careful than the broad attack on intelligentsia and students that 
the Polish authorities engaged in 1968, and certainly not so severe as 
that repression Jaruzelski's martial law represented. And since the 
1974-75 trial of Mikl6s Haraszti, intellectuals had not been subject to 
any criminal proceedings, 44 although in the late 1970s several leading 
independent Budapest intellectuals were pressured to emigrate 45 and 
in the early 1980s, independent intellectuals were harassed with ad- 
ministrative fines. 46 While in the early 1980s people were in jail for 
political reasons, they were not the Budapest opposition intellectuals. 47 
These three social conditions distinguished Hungary from Poland (the 
demobilization of the working class, the legitimacy of compromise, and 
the manipulative skill of the authorities) were fully developed in the 
1980s, even though they were already apparent in 1968 when the 
regional planners' project inspired Konrfid and Szelrnyi's new class 
thesis. 48 Although Polish sociologists would have been unlikely to 
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entertain such a thesis in the beginning of the 1970s given working 
class mobilization, Gierek's technocratic consumerist socialism might 
have made it an appealing thesis had the Polish communist succeeded. 
But his initial failure in the middle of the decade and Solidarity's emer- 
gence in 1980 made the new class thesis seem inappropriate to Poland, 
considering workers' mobilization and the regime repression and the 
illegitimacy of compromise that followed. Szel6nyi himself began to 
back off from such a thesis in the mid 1980s (1986-87), but by dec- 
ade's end he found ample justification in the new Hungarian politics to 
argue that the intelligentsia might just have won class power, if the dis- 
course of the day was any indication. 49 
These three social conditions differentiating Poland from Hungary are 
themselves associated with the opposed experiences these societies 
had in the revolutionary year 1956. For Poland, 1956 was initially a 
year of triumph, a time when Polish party authorities defied Soviet 
authorities, opened new cultural boundaries, ended experiments with 
agricultural collectivization, established better relations with the 
Catholic Church, and legalized greater workplace democracy through 
workers councils. Even if this "Polish October" led to disappointment a 
few years later, and outright rejection by 1968, it was a far cry from the 
total defeat that 1956 signified for Hungary's opposition. Even more 
significant than the outcome of 1956, however, was its relationship to 
the 1980s in these two countries. 
By 1980 in Poland, 1956 barely figured into the opposition's con- 
sciousness. The legacy of workers' councils and revisionist Party poli- 
tics was far less important to consider than the issues raised by the 
1968, 1970, and 1976 events, which involved independent trade 
unions, the role of the opposition intellectual, and the making of civil 
society. These was the decisive generation making events for the oppo- 
sition of 1980, and it was their legacies Polish intellectuals were obliged 
to discuss. But in Hungary the legacy of the 1956 revolution continued 
to shape the politics of opposition intellectuals and of civil society 
through the end of the 1980s. JS_nos Kis, one of Hungary's leading 
democratic opposifionists, wrote of 1956-57 in 1987: 
Hungar ian  society has  yet to come  to terms with the  total defeat it suffered at 
that  time, and those  in power have yet to overcome the burdens  of their vic- 
tory. The  economic  crisis which in the 80's overwhelms Hungary  is the  crisis 
of  the  restorat ion regime which came into existence thirty years ago . . . .  
Today we mus t  r emember  the  restorat ion not  just in order  to regain moral  
integrity, but  in order  to unders tand  the present  political crisis of  the regime. 
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We have to analyze former (failed) proposals of conciliation in order  to find 
a more effective compromise to our present and future (perhaps less hope-  
less situation). The events of 1956-57 developed from a moral issue into a 
political one. 5° 
Kis's analysis of that period clearly informs, and reflects, the Hungarian 
political strategy of the 1980s. He follows a form of historical explana- 
tion based on radical contingency rather than deterministic logic. He 
emphasizes how various "accidents" shaped subsequent events in 
1956-57. For instance, had there been no Soviet tanks introduced to 
Budapest on 23 October, a new government under the aegis of the 
People's Patriotic Front might have been formed and a multi-party sys- 
tem not become inevitable. 51 Or when the Kfidfir government took 
power with the aid of Soviet tanks, the Kfidfirism of that period (under- 
stood by Kis as three planks: the public display of party unity, the 
political neutralization of society, and the refusal to recognize any 
extra-Party negotiating partner52), could have been replaced by the 
retrieval of Stalinists or by a negotiated compromise with Imre Nagy. 53 
This kind of historical explanation encourages the adoption of a politi- 
cal strategy based on compromise rather than fundamentalist politics. 
In particular, Kis studies the strategies of the workers' council move- 
ment as examples, especially significant given that they survived the 
formal restoration of the Kfid~r government in Budapest on 7 Novem- 
ber. The peaceful resistance by the Greater Budapest Central Workers' 
Council, formed on 14 November, was the first exemplar of sophisti- 
cated compromise politics, where they gradually dropped their 
demands for the restoration of the Nagy government and multiparty 
system as well as the departure of Soviet troops in favor of promoting 
the self-organization of workers' councils as well as council access to an 
open public sphere. 54 The Stalinist wing of the Party had grown in- 
creasingly strong toward the end of November, and provoked enough 
violent conflict to end the possibility of negotiations with politically 
minded workers councils. The second phase of council resistance was 
dominated by the Csepel Iron and Metal Works workers council, which 
had advocated a less political function for councils, and took the re- 
stored K~dfirist regime as its point of departure, not the ideals of the 
Hungarian revolution. But by 8-11 January, the possibility of even this 
kind of compromise was ruined by the increasing hard line of the 
Kfidfirist government, and the violent suppression of a strike by that 
factory's workers. These compromise strategies might have worked, he 
thinks, had the international scene and internal conflicts been different. 
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Nevertheless, the sophistication of these council activities suggests to 
him that "modern  society possesses the political capacity for the prac- 
tice of an effective democracy"  given that these councils were led by 
workers and engineers. 55 But the legacy of 1956 has destroyed that 
democrat ic  capacity already proven. To cope with the demand Kfidfir 
made,  that society "forget" its experience in return for material com- 
pensation, 56 society had to withdraw into private life. Under  these cir- 
cumstances, Kis writes, 57 
Whether a privatized society identifies with its defeated struggles or tries to 
forget them depends decisively on what its spiritual leaders - writers, jounal- 
ists, artists, historians, priests, teachers - articulate. They, after all, are in the 
position that, by virtue of their profession, their words and silence constitute 
a public statement. It depends on them to decide if they will provide symbols 
of loyalty and models of endurance to be emulated. In Hungary, this stratum 
did not supply society with the instruments to enable it to remain loyal to its 
revolution while making peace with reality. Indeed, the selfsame intelligentsia 
evolved into the source and foundation of the consensus that insists that the 
cultivation of intellectual opposition is a 19th century romantic pose and 
inappropriate to Realpolitik. 
Indeed, even Kis, himself an important  part  of that intellectual opposi-  
tion, was too Realpolitik for the events that would soon transpire. In a 
sense, while the social conditions continued to inform the 1989 revolu- 
tion, the lessons of 1956 soon became quite irrelevant. Compromise  
gave way to revolution. But while the strategy of compromise  in social 
t ranformation proved outdated, his identification of principal actors 
remained accurate. 
The intelligentsia's creation of Hungarian civil society 
Although the 1956 revolution was a genuinely popular  uprising, its 
brutal suppression left the popular  classes demobil ized and depoliti- 
cized. 58 For  over two decades, one could not even speak of an "opposi-  
tion" in any significant sense, in which time Poland had already gone 
through two major  working-class rebellions and several protests by 
intellectuals. There  certainly were independent  dissident intellectuals, 
as the layoffs and forced emigrations suggest. But an organized opposi-  
tion politics only returned to Hungary  in 1977. 
In January of that year, 34 intellectuals signed a letter, published in the 
western press, indicating their solidarity with the principles of the 
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Czechoslovak group, Charter 77. Human rights and civil liberties, as in 
Poland the previous year, had become the language of opposition in 
Czechoslovakia, and now in Hungary too. Pierre Kende describes the 
Hungarian signatories as "critical" marxists, students of Lukfics, who 
were young and "highly intellectual but not very political "'59 What is 
more, a significant number of them belonged to the Budapest Jewish 
intelligentsia and had been dismissed from their university posts earlier 
in the decade. While the Polish regime launched a selective and rela- 
tively brutal campaign against the working class and intellectual oppo- 
sition after 1976, in Hungary the authorities decided to ignore the 
January action by this small group of intellectuals. 
In the succeeding years, opposition activities remained largely the 
province of relatively elite intellectuals and students. There were the 
publication and distribution of samizdat materials as well as "private" 
conferences on taboo subjects. The line between opposition and offi- 
cial activities was sometimes quite blurred, given the use of public facil- 
ities for activities that themselves could have merited oppositional 
status. 6° A group of populist poets raised the most significant cultural 
issue of this long decade of Hungarian dissent: the fate of Hungarians 
living in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and especially Romania. 
The activities of intellectuals did not just involve talk, however. One 
group, students of the exiled sociologist Istvfin Kemrny, also initiated 
an innovative campaign in 1979. They established a private charity 
called Sz.E.T.A. to help the poor. This was oppositional only in the 
sense that official rhetoric recognized no poverty in the system, and 
provided no particular relief for them. The authorities finally dealt with 
this strategy by acknowledging poverty and introducing a policy to help 
the poor. Independent political action took new forms too. 
In 1983, the election law was changed so as to require multiple lists for 
candidates to the Parliament. In 1985, in the first elections to be affected 
by this law, only two independent candidates were finally elected, a 
journalist named Zoltfin Kirfily and L~szl6 Csoma, director of the 
Keszthely local museum. A few Party-sponsored deputies, most nota- 
bly physician Erika Tomsits, asserted their independence too, however, 
and together with Kirfily formed an informal but independent caucus 
within the Assembly. In general, Jfinos Kis found most of the Assem- 
bly mentally impoverished, unable to form a "comprehensive under- 
standing of the issues. ''6~ But Kirfily and Tomsits represented the kind 
of people necessary for Hungary's public revitalization: "politically- 
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able legislators who have not yet been elevated into the official hierar- 
chy of positions, ranks, and titles," those who had the political vision 
that could enhance the National Assembly's position so as gradually to 
transfer national affairs from behind Party doors to the public arena. 62 
But they could not do that alone, and certainly not without help from 
independent social movements, he argued. 
At that time, it appeared that Hungarians had the compromise politics 
that might enable negotiation, unlike Poland. But they did not have the 
social movements like Solidarity that could force negotiations. Never- 
theless, over the decade, a growing number of movements did become 
rather significant, even if they remained the province of the intelligent- 
sia and those who anticipated joining its ranks. 
Spontaneous demonstrations led by students took place with growing 
intensity over the 1980s, with the anniversary of the 1848 revolution, 
15 March, serving as a regular spark. An independent peace movement 
called Dialogue also was formed by students in 1983 in order to chal- 
lenge the official peace movement. Although its members also tried to 
remain distinct from the opposition, it was finally repressed by the 
government in August 1984. Perhaps the largest and most significant 
independent movement was formed later that year, led by members of 
the scientific intelligentsia. The environmentalist group called the 
Danube Circle was established to oppose the construction of a dam by 
Czechoslovak and Hungarian authorities on the Danube River. The 
long decade of Hungarian dissent, from 1977 to 1988, thus saw a pro- 
liferation of a new independent politics, even if they were restricted 
mainly to the intelligentsia and students. 63 The political revolution of 
1988-89 was also carried out mainly by the intelligentsia, in two domi- 
nant currents. 64 
The populists were numerically the largest group, and hardest to define 
formally. Five of its nine founding members were poets and writers. 
They identified their movement with the needs of the Hungarian 
nation, defined ethnically or racially. They generally spoke of the "third 
road" between capitalism and communism. The authorities had culti- 
vated them as an ally, especially since the 1956 revolution, although in 
the mid-1980s the populists began to identify with some projects of the 
democratic opposition. The populists formed the Hungarian Demo- 
cratic Forum in 1987 and generally avoided technical programs for 
economic transition in favor of literary emotional politics. They pre- 
fered "intuition to analysis, and literature to social science. "65 Until the 
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November referendum on the timing of the Presidential election, they 
were the most successful in Hungarian transition politics, having won 
each of the four elections in the summer of 1989. They finally won the 
spring elections in 1990 and together with the Smallholders and Chris- 
tian Democrats formed the governing coalition in mid-1990. But in the 
beginning of the revolution, they were the most closely allied with the 
reformist Party leader, Imre Pozsgay. 
The other significant group of intellectuals in the 1988-89 revolution 
was called pro-western, democratic, liberal, and urban. Many had their 
origins in the Budapest School of critical Marxism, and many were of 
Jewish descent. From 1981, their main efforts were directed toward the 
independent journal Beszdl6', but in 1988 they formed the Alliance of 
Free Democrats. Their program for institutional reform was generally 
considered the most elaborate and formally specified of all the opposi- 
tion. They were often allied informally with reformers within the 
authorities, especially the reformist legal experts and economists. Many 
other political parties and social groups have formed since 1988, but 
these two represented the significant intellectual tendencies in the poli- 
tics of the 1988-89 Hungarian revolution. That was reflected in the 
spring 1990 elections as these two parties received the most votes. 
The populism of the Hungarian Democratic Forum reproduced the 
traditional form of Hungarian twentieth-century nationalism. Above 
all, they were concerned with the fate of the Hungarian minorities 
living abroad. They also promoted the idea of Hungary being somehow 
special and in between the west and east, deserving its own unique 
identity based on an independent small-holding peasantry. But by 
1989, their emotive program did not suggest as radical a transforma- 
tion of the Soviet-type system as the Free Democrats, for the main 
question of instititutional transformation was not based on cultural 
questions or even agriculture's ownership. The Soviet-type system's 
main antagonist had become the institutionalization of free market- 
based civil society, and it was the Alliance of Free Democrats that pro- 
moted this as an alternative to the Forum's populism, and as the means 
for the transformation of the Soviet-type system. 
This group had already begun to move down that liberal road in the 
beginning of the 1980s. Much as in Poland, civil society became the 
principal alternative politics of emancipation to that of nationalism. To 
struggle in the Soviet-type system for the rule of law rather than of the 
Party, for free associations instead of Party-sponsored organizations, 
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for freedom from censorship and a multi-party system provided Hun- 
garians, like Poles, with a coherent tranformative strategy that did not 
have to elevate one's nation above others. Gy6rgy Konrfid expressed 
this simply: 66 
We want that internal process with which East  Central Europe  is already 
pregnant; we want bourgeois civil liberties and an embourgeoisment  that is 
not hedged about with prohibatory decrees. We don't  want the authorities to 
have discretionary rights over us. We want constitutional guarantees; we want 
it clear that semifreedom is not freedom, half-truth is not truth, liberalization 
is not liberalism, democratization is not democracy. We want no less than 
what the most advanced democracies already have. 
Unlike the Polish, however, this Hungarian project was not very suc- 
cessful in providing a program that mobilizes those who are not from 
the intelligentsia. The groupings discussed above were mainly from that 
class, and if not, as in the Populists, they were nevertheless led by intel- 
lectuals. Two illustrations can further illustrate the intelligentsia's 
hegemony in the creation of Hungarian civil society. 
The character of self-organization in Hungarian civil society 
On 30 March 1988, thirty-two young intellectuals, students, and work- 
ers (although mainly law students) established FIDESZ, or the League 
of Young Democrats. The Hungarian acronym was designed intention- 
ally to resemble the Latin fidelis, to symbolize the group's aim and 
character. FIDESZ was designed as an independent youth organization 
that would fill the gap left by the Party's youth organization. It was 
formed on the basis of an imagined civil society, in order to make civil 
society more real. Following Hungarian postwar political theorist 
Istvfin Bib6, they argued that the law should be made to control the 
state and its rulers, rather than made to control the people. It argued 
that the opposition should take rights guaranteed by the constitution 
seriously, and thus treat the law as if it, rather than the Party, ruled. On 
that basis, FIDESZ used the constitutional guarantee of association to 
defend their formation. Their leaders were arrested, and legal proceed- 
ings were begun against them. But in the three months of trial, the 
group grew to more than two thousand members nationwide. They lost 
the trial, but they ultimately won. In January 1989 legislation was 
passed in the Hungarian parliament that guaranteed their rights of 
assembly. 67 
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As a movement of students and young intellectuals, FIDESZ did not 
claim to represent other classes. The group was mainly symbolic and 
exemplary, hoping that through their own civil disobedience and pres- 
sure for the rule of law others might learn how to exercise their own 
rights. These activists believed that civil society and the rule of law 
would represent the interests of everyone, so long as people could learn 
to exercise their rights. FIDESZ activists ultimately would not only 
seek election to Parliament but also try to promote a broader aware- 
ness of legal rights and possibilities to workers and especially peasants. 
FIDESZ thus represents the new "classless" universalism suggested by 
civil society. For these young lawyers, the emancipatory alternative is a 
law-based society in which individuals understand their legal rights 
and are ready to engage them, and where people's economic needs 
would be satisfied by their participation in a free market of goods and 
services. 6s 
This self-organization and transformational praxis represent the 
hegemony of one relatively elite part of the intelligentsia. Formal 
equality before the law carries, of course, many of the limitations on 
democracy Marx noted long ago, 69 but that is not the only problem. 
Because peasants and workers were not engaged in the creation of this 
civil society project, they have left a weak imprint in the constitution of 
the new Hungary. Furthermore, although activists claimed that they 
would enter the lifeworld of peasants and workers to explain to them 
their rights, their preeminent struggle has been to assure this legal state 
and their place in it. Given that struggles for power in this new state 
have taken precedence, popular movements were not engaged except 
as voting masses to be swayed, rather than as program making actors in 
their own right. Indeed, as the media campaigns for the elections 
showed, the "public arena" created by the 1988-89 revolution resem- 
bled more the public-relations market of U.S. capitalism rather than the 
civil society idealized by the Hungarian democratic opposition. 
This transformational praxis should not be understood as a project of 
the entire intelligentsia either insofar as the economic interests of many 
intellectuals require far more than "neutral" law-based market society. 
Much as for other employees of the Soviet-type state, the intelligentsia 
needed an independent trade union. 
Given the experience of Polish Solidarity, independent trade unions 
might have suggested an alternative future for Hungary, but even they 
were overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia. On 16 May 1988, the first 
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independent trade union, the Democratic Union of Scientific Workers, 
representing those who work in the nation's research institutes, was 
founded. They followed a similar strategy as FIDESZ in their found- 
ing, by acting as if a legal state existed. Because the Hungarian Consti- 
tution and labor code had no guidelines about the registration of 
unions, and because Hungary accepted the International Labor Or- 
ganization's statements on freedom of association, the Union argued 
that it had the legal right to form. TM Other unions of the intelligentsia 
were formed in its wake, including those of filmmakers and teachers. 
The principal affiliates of the federative Democratic League of Inde- 
pendent Trade Unions, founded on 20 December 1988, also were 
white-collar unions. 71 Urban speculated that blue-collar workers resist- 
ed this independent union organization because a) they still feared the 
government; b) they were divided by opportunities in the second 
economy; c) they feared the generation of Polish economic conditions; 
and d) they could not unify behind any ideology, positive (Catholicism) 
or negative (anti-Party), as Polish workers could. 72 One should add that 
the old communist unions, in alliance with the "red barons" or large 
enterprise managers, continue to exert influence over the distribution 
of resources, and therefore proved more sensible organizations for 
workers from the largest enterprises. 73 
Although the personnel of the trade unions further illustrated the he- 
gemony of the Hungarian intelligentsia in the making of its civil society, 
the union movement could have had different consequences than other 
organizations of the intelligentsia. Their unionization reflected the 
homogenization of intellectuals in the Soviet-type system. The intelli- 
gentsia was not organizing on the basis of its distinction, nor on behalf 
of some universal principle of civil rights or national interest. Instead, it 
organized on behalf of its own self-defense, much as any other group in 
Hungarian civil society would have. And to assure its self-defense, it 
would have been obliged to act more like state "employees" than inde- 
pendent intellectuals, establishing alliances with other employees. If 
that had occurred, they might have served a functionally analogous role 
as organic intellectuals in capitalist society, or professionals in Solidari- 
ty. But without other independent unions having been established, and 
because peasants and workers were not well represented in such a 
federation, this union of members of the Hungarian intelligentsia 
represented only the continuation of the intelligentsia's hegemony in 
civil society rather than the popularization of civil society itself. 
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This union strategy may have led to the creation of a more popular civil 
society had the authorities not followed the strategy they did, however. 
Instead of forcing the hand of the popular classes, the authorities pre- 
vented their mobilization by negotiating the post-communist transition 
with the intelligentsia who made civil society. 
Hungary's post-communist transition 
The hegemony of the intelligentsia in the construction of Hungarian 
civil society was not only apparent in the personnel of its associations 
or in the philosophies of its proponents. Hungary's political revolution 
was itself derived from the interactions of this intelligentsia with Party 
officials, in typically intellectual forms: conferences and publications. 
The most proximate foundation for the political revolution was Hunga- 
ry's economic crisis. Although not so obvious as that in Poland or 
Romania, by the early 1980s Hungary was in a dangerous economic 
situation with the highest debt per capita level in Eastern Europe. But 
this crisis need not have laid the foundations for dramatic change. 
Tamfis Bauer, one of Hungary's leading reform economists, argued that 
Hungary's economic reform depended on three conditions: (1) a crisis 
so profound as to convince both ruling elites and intellectuals that the 
command economy was failing, (2) the existence of a "more or less free 
intellectual community of economists" and (3) "the readiness of both 
scholars and government experts to cooperate and make the necessary 
compromises. ''74 Economicreform in 1968-1972 had been shelved in 
Hungary, even if the reform economists themselves remained in their 
positions. Economic reform therefore depended on the autonomy of 
economists and the willingness of political authorities to respect their 
independent expertise. It depended on the restoration of the intelli- 
gentsia's traditional position of autonomy and authority. But the intelli- 
gentsia won this authority not because of tradition or because of their 
special talent but because of the dynamics of change in the Party itself. 
In the spring of 1986, Imre Pozsgay, then General Secretary of the 
Patriotic People's Front, requested that reform economists produce a 
report on the economic crisis. 75 Published in 1987, this report, entitled 
"Turnabout and Reform," documented the economic crisis and pro- 
posed solutions that were heretofore only discussed in samizdat form. 76 
This report was used later by Kfiroly Grdsz to oust longtime leader 
J~nos Kfidfir. 77 Thus, intellectuals were still perceived as instruments to 
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be used by the authorities in their own struggles. But this political 
opening enabled intellectuals to move toward the establishment of a 
more autonomous politics too. 
In June of the same year, the democratic opposition published in the 
samizdat journal Beszdl6' an article called "The Social Contract," in 
which they called for political pluralism with an independent parlia- 
ment and freedom of the press, although not yet a multi-party system. 
Later that fall, the populists held a meeting where they established the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum. Significantly, Pozsgay was there 
attempting to establish his base outside the party. In effect, a small 
group of Party reformers had intended to use this mobilization of 
reformist economists, populists, and democratic opposition to change 
the Party leadership and they finally succeeded. 
By May 1988 Kfidfir was ousted from his position. Kfiroly Grdsz was 
but an interim leader, however, as his indecisiveness and inability to 
win significant improvements for Hungarian minorities living in Roma- 
nia undercut his position. TM Between the fall of 1988 and winter of 
1989 the Party reformers steadily improved their position within the 
Party. Simultaneously, Party rhetoric came to accept more and more 
the prospects of a multiparty system, even if still incorporating Com- 
munist Party leadership. But the opposition organized itself into a new 
body that spring that effectively undermined even this radical reformist 
strategy. 
The Opposition Round Table 79 was formed on 22 March 1989 in 
order to assure that negotiations with the authorities would not be 
manipulated to allow the Party unfair influence over the structure of 
the talks and their outcomes. Thus the foundation on which the Party 
reformers thought to extend their influence, independent associations 
of the intelligentsia, became instead the vehicle of an autonomous civil 
society that would negotiate the establishment of a multi-party political 
party system and inspire the dissolution of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party itself. 8° 
In contrast to the popular perception of negotiations in Poland, the 
Hungarian roundtable could claim to represent formally less than 
1 percent of the Hungarian population. 8t Nevertheless, the Hungarians 
negotiated a more complete revision of the Soviet-type system than the 
Poles. Although this could appear as a paradox, 82 it is quite sensible if 
this class bases for civil society are kept in view. The Hungarian politi- 
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cal revolution of 1989 engaged only the intelligentsia, and therein a 
tacit alliance with Party reformers. Hungarian civil society was partially 
restored because the transformation was wrought from within the in- 
cipient ruling class of former Party bureaucrats and intelligentsia. The 
Polish case seemed to have promised something different with the 
struggle of Solidarity, even if it ultimately became a variation on the 
Hungarian theme too. 
Poland's post-communist transition 
Solidarity's very size and heterogeneity meant that it could have repre- 
sented different things to different people. Certainly once it evolved 
beyond a defensive strategy for self-organization and toward a program 
for institutional reconstruction, a lively politics within the movement 
was healthy if not inevitable. But for the movement to survive as a total 
movement of civil society against the state, debate had to respect the 
anchorpoints of Solidarity's self understanding in self-organization, 
equality, and self-government. In 1980-81, dialogue, both explicit and 
implicit, reproduced these values within this cross-class movement. 
The imposition of martial law destroyed the possibility for that contin- 
uing dialogue, however, and with it the cross-class quality of the move- 
ment. The public sphere shrunk, as most people retreated from politics. 
This sphere retreated unevenly, as the intelligentsia was more likely to 
remain actively engaged in politics than were workers. The distinction 
of the Solidarity movement thus began to fade. The pragmatic con- 
struction of a political movement that embraces equality, pluralism, and 
self-management as a condition of cross-class unity depends on an 
open public sphere with broad cross-class participation. This breadth 
could not be preserved under conditions of martial law and its after- 
math. This new, uneven participation has several social foundations, s3 
The Polish authorities treated workers and the intelligentsia differently 
during martial law. On the one hand, the authorities established new 
unions that promised to realize many of the employees' demands for 
which Solidarity struggled. Although these new unions never won the 
support, especially among skilled workers in larger factories, that Soli- 
darity did, the new unions were especially uninfluential among the 
intelligentsia and the fields they dominated: the health sector, the cul- 
tural establishment, and universities. 84 
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On the other, the authorities treated workers more harshly than the 
intelligentsia for oppositional politics. When interned, members of the 
intelligentsia were generally housed separately from workers, and treat- 
ed better. The oppositional activities of workers also were more strictly 
curtailed. Strikes in enterprises were treated more harshly than the 
actors' and writers' boycotts. Efforts by physicians, teachers, academ- 
ics, and artists to establish a more open field of information and culture 
went relatively unhampered. The Minister of Culture even said that 
while they did not support it, they didn't go out of their way to perse- 
cute the underground press either, s5 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
workers' oppositional politics declined more dramatically than that of 
intellectuals. This unevenness has had devastating consequences on the 
class character of the opposition. 
The social distance between classes grew in this period. Many in the 
intelligentsia were angry with workers for having failed to mount great- 
er resistance to the regime. Negative stereotypes of workers became 
m o r e  c o m m o n .  86 Solidarity also began to be criticized for having been 
too socialist, too "workerist. ''s7 The response of workers to this criti- 
cism was ambivalent. On the one hand, they again began to identify the 
intelligentsia with their supervisors rather than with themselves. On the 
other, they began to rely on intellectuals more for maintaining the 
opposition, s8 
The intelligentsia realized this responsibility, but also assumed greater 
autonomy from the existing factory-based movements among workers. 
The anchorpoints of Solidarity's self-understanding, in social self-or- 
ganization, equality, and self-management, were no longer decisive in 
defining the programs of the opposition, as the intelligentsia was no 
longer dependent on workers. Drawing upon the symbolism of Solidar- 
ity if not its organization, intellectuals could now claim to represent 
workers, but only as they represented the Polish nation. 
The opposition fragmented into several currents. Smolar s9 identified 
the mainstream opposition with Walesa, Solidarity, and the Temporary 
Coordinating Commission. Smolar called realists those who consid- 
ered it ineffective to continue to press for Solidarity's relegalization, 
and advocated coming to terms with the system. Smolar recognized a- 
nother wave as radical for its greater demands than that of the main- 
stream, pressing for some kind of political revolution in Poland. Finally, 
another tendency noted by Smolar was that characterized by the poli- 
tics of youth, who rejected old formulations and sought a new politics 
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resembling more anarchism than socialist or labor politics. Intellectuals 
could be found constructing all of these currents. 
The regime itself clearly tried to shape oppositional politics. It treated 
most harshly those like Kornel Morawiecki of Fighting Solidarity, 
Leszek Moczulski of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, 
and others who advocated some kind of revolutionary, even if non-vio- 
lent, politics. It lambasted the youth-based, independent peace move- 
ment WiP as traitorous to Polish society. It imprisoned those unionists 
who advocated more confrontational politics, while allowing those, like 
Bujak, who advocated dialogue, to continue their underground exist- 
ence. 9° It also encouraged the realists by offering selective inducements 
for cooperation. 
For those most willing to cooperate with the regime, Jaruzelski estab- 
lished a "consultative council," with about one-third of its members 
from the regime, one third from Catholic circles and one-third inde- 
pendent intellectuals. This council, established in 1986, did not gain 
widespread social support and only a few prominent intellectuals, 
including lawyer Wladyslaw Sfla-Nowicki and writer Andrzej Swiecic- 
ki, joined it. The authorities also sought to promote a more independ- 
ent opposition, so long as they remained "pragmatic," or respectful of 
Poland's system and geopolitical realities. The best example of this is 
their permission for the establishment in 198 7 of the first independent, 
non-religious periodical in the Warsaw Pact, Res Publica. Although still 
subject to censorship, the publication pursued its liberal democratic 
themes vigorously. 
The regime also encouraged another kind of realism attractive to mem- 
bers of the intelligentsia among others. It facilitated the promotion of a 
new patriotic politics, based on the spirit of entrepreneurialism. 
Although its promoters included several former worker activists, this 
agenda was also anti-worker, arguing that the solution for Poland's 
dilemmas lies in the promotion of a free market economy and private 
enterprise based on the multiplication of wealth, not in the continua- 
tion of workerist politics based on redistribution. 91 
In effect, with these activities the Polish authorities were trying to es- 
tablish a new modus vivendi between them and civil society. But this 
new agreement was not based on broad public participation, as Soli- 
darity had been. Instead, it was to be based on a skewed participation, 
with workers returned to narrow union concerns, and the intelligentsia 
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once again established as the representatives of the nation. One might 
say that the Polish authorities tried to reconstruct the Polish opposition 
in the Hungarian image. In so doing, the anachronistic status of autono- 
mous intellectuals in communist politics was completely abandoned in 
the hope that the realism of such intellectuals could restore some meas- 
ure of public consensus for the Polish communist order. 
Although it has become new common wisdom that this strategy could 
not have succeeded, its failure does not have its main roots in intellec- 
tual politics. The main reason this strategy failed was that a new class of 
militant workers emerged to destroy this modus vivendi in the making. 
In May and August 1988, workers in Gdafisk and several other places 
initiated a wave of occupation strikes demanding, among other things, 
increases in wages and Solidarity's restoration. This movement was not, 
however, initiated by old Solidarity acitivists. This was a new genera- 
tion of workers, who trusted few outside their immediate milieu. 
The authorities were extremely apprehensive with this new wave of 
strikes, fearing they could not contain them. As such, the authorities 
had to abandon their strategy for promoting a new realism, and turn to 
another realism represented by the old Solidarity leadership. This lead- 
ership was, by now, relatively trustworthy in comparison to these new 
anarchistic youth. The authorities' only hope was that these former 
opponents could restrain workers from further strikes. In return, the 
Solidarity leadership demanded negotiations for Solidarity's legaliza- 
tion. This exchange resulted in roundtable negotiations that were or- 
ganized in February 1989, and concluded in April. 
The principal distinction of this mainstream Solidarity leadership from 
the realist opposition was that it insisted on Solidafity's legalization. In 
this sense, the "realists" were left behind in the roundtable negotiations 
leading to Solidarity's legalization. But aside from the question of 
whether independent trade unions were realistic or not, the realists and 
the mainstream of Solidarity shared a great deal in their vision of an 
alternative Poland. What nobody anticipated was the responsibility 
Solidarity would soon assume. 
The contingency of communism's transformation 
The Polish roundtable agreements were considerable accomplish- 
ments. Intellectuals from both Solidarity and the regime agreed to put 
59 
the past behind them and to negotiate on the basis of Poland's alterna- 
tive future. 92 It was, after all, the past that most divided them. Both sides 
had come to recognize that some political compromise would have to be 
reached, with communists and Solidarity in government. Both sides too 
had come to recognize the necessity of fundamental market reforms in 
the economy. And by the time of the negotiations, the cultural sphere 
already had opened up such that there were small differences on mat- 
ters of the present and future between underground publications from 
the Solidarity mainstream and those published officially. 
There were, of course, important differences expressed within the 
negotiations. They were divided over what proportion of seats in the 
Sejm were to be allocated to the Communists and their allies. There 
were also sharp differences in the economic reform, over the degree to 
which wage increases would be pegged to increases in prices. But here, 
the official communist union associated with Alfred Miodowicz de- 
manded greater wage compensation than either the Party or Solidarity. 
Miodowicz's group also demanded more egalitarian wage increases than 
Solidarity. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached that allowed open 
elections for all Senate seats and for 161 out of 460 seats in the Sejm. 
The June elections turned out to be a landslide. To everyone's surprise, 
the Solidarity Civic Committee, associated with Lech Walesa and the 
mainstream Solidarity leadership, won every seat but one available to 
it. This new Sejm and Senate were then obliged to elect a President, 
who roundtable negotiators agreed would be Wojciech Jaruzelski. But 
those elected by Solidarity found themselves in a difficult position, for 
their electorate did not want the man who imposed martial law to be 
their new President. Nevertheless, by managing to be absent, a number 
of Solidarity legislators allowed the Communist-led coalition to elect 
Jaruzelski president. The Peasant delegation of this bloc, however, bolt- 
ed in the next election as they refused to support Jaruzelski's nominee, 
Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszcak, as Prime Minister. The defection of 
the Peasant Party acivitists to Solidarity's side allowed the election of 
Solidarity advisor and Tygodnik Solidarnogd editor Tadeusz Mazo- 
wiecki as Prime Minister. 
As in Hungary in 1988-89, there was a political revolution in Poland. 
In the roundtable negotiations, the Polish United Workers Party effec- 
tively ceded its monopoly of power to a government that they antici- 
pated would still be Communist led, even if with a legal opposition in 
Solidarity. Due to the unexpected failure of the Party at the polls, the 
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Party was obliged to establish a new political formation, with the Party 
as the leading partner in a coalition with Solidarity. But due to the 
unexpected assertion of independence by the formerly subservient 
Peasant Party, the only option left for this new government was to es- 
tablish a Solidarity-led coalition, with Solidarity responsible for the 
economy and the Party holding cabinet positions overseeing the milita- 
ry, internal affairs, transportation, and foreign trade. 
I began this article with one stated aim being the clarification of the 
contingency with which the transformation of Soviet-type society in 
Eastern Europe has been made. Of course most of the discourse 
around communism's end today is based on the system's inherent eco- 
nomic defects, or the vigor of the national cultures of Eastern Europe. 
The point missed by this emphasis is that the process of communism's 
collapse is not preordained by these structural factors. For Hungary, 
the smoothness of systemic transition was quite surprising and due in 
large part to the failure of the Party reformers to retain hegemony in 
roundtable negotiations, and even more surprisingly perhaps, in the 
efforts of the Party reformers to move transition ahead. 93 This is per- 
haps less counterintuitive for Hungarian analysts, accustomed as they 
are to theories of change based on contingency. 94 The appropriateness 
of a contingent theory of Polish communism's downfall is more con- 
troversial, given the dominant tenor of Polish analysis. 95 But here, per- 
haps even more than in Hungary, contingency reigns in explaining the 
particular form of Polish revolution: from the formation of the cross- 
class movement, to its dissolution over the 1980s, to the failure of the 
incipient Jaruzelski alliance with intellectuals given workers' strikes in 
1988, and most dramatically, the events of the summer of 1989 where 
Solidarity was thrust, however reluctantly, into power. 
This image of contingency is reinforced by the apparent difference be- 
tween outcomes in Hungary and Poland. The opposition that has come 
to power in Poland is more homogenous in its initial claim to a single 
organizational allegiance in Solidarity, which itself purports to be an 
organization with roots in the working class, while Hungary's opposi- 
tion round table was pluralistic and based in the intelligentsia from the 
start. But to take account of the transformation of Solidarity's class 
base suggests a determinism that we might not otherwise recognize 
were we to rest only on Solidarity's self-presentation. The contingency 
then lies in the character of the opposition to communism and the form 
of its transition. The sequal to communism is structured by a more 
powerful determinism. 
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The determinism of post communism 
No longer is Solidarity understood, as Touraine et al. described it, as a 
trade union and movement for democratic and national independ- 
ence. 96 Solidarity's leading identity as trade union has disappeared. The 
union has not had the same success in organizing workers as it had in 
1980-81. While in the beginning of the decade some 9.5 million peo- 
ple belonged to the union, by June of 1989 less than 2 million were 
paying union dues. 97 What is more, Miodowicz claims that his post- 
PZPR 98 unions have not been hurt significantly by Solidarity's relegali- 
zation. 99 By December 1989 he claimed the movement still had over 
6.5 million members. Although these numbers have a less than obvious 
meaning given that his members need not pay any dues to belong, Mio- 
d0wicz's position does represent something potentially significant in 
post-communist politics, a point to which I return. 
Polish Solidarity can no longer be understood as a democratic union 
and social movement defending society, but rather is an elite associa- 
tion devoted to a state-level politics designed to move Poland toward 
becoming a "normal" country. 
Solidarity became elite in two senses: first the class base moved from 
workers to intelligentsia, and second, the intellectuals who have come 
to represent Solidarity have a new status that separates them from their 
grassroots organization. The June election campaign was organized by 
Solidarity Civic Committees not elected by any formal body, much less 
by Solidarity's remaining trade-union base. They were, in addition, 
composed primarily of representatives of the intelligentsia. 1°° The can- 
didates chosen to represent Solidarity were not elected either, and 
rather picked by Lech Walesa and his closest advisors. Their most 
effective campaign element was a photograph of each candidate with 
Walesa, below which was written "We must win. ''1°1 These new elite 
politicians also were overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia. Of Soli- 
darity's 261 nominations, only 10 were of workers and 35 of individual 
farmers. In contrast, there were 22 professors, 50 engineers, 35 
lawyers, 20 journalists or columnists, 16 economists, 14 teachers, 13 
health care employees, and 1 religion teacher, m2 This slate lost only one 
seat in the contested elections, and it was to a millionaire private entre- 
preneur, Henryk Stoldosa. In terms of the composition of their new 
parliaments, Poland and Hungary have reached some kind of conver- 
gence. Of 386 parliamentary deputies, no more than 10 percent can 
be considered as anything other than highly educated in Hungary. m3 
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But the power of this convergence lies in more than the social compo- 
sition of parliaments, and rather in the new power relations that 
shape the politics of its leading intellectuals. The vision of the future 
is one of "normalcy," in which the market economy has assumed pride 
of place. 
One observer in Polityka was struck by the change in the discourse of 
Solidarity leaders. Instead of themes like self-management, Solidarity 
leaders speak of company partnerships (spdtki) and "joint ventures" 
(even rendered by Poles in English); instead of social self-organization 
they speak of the breakup of state monopolies in the economy. In gen- 
eral, instead of solidarity amongst people, Polish journalist Jerzy 
Baczyliski finds social disintegration, where speculation and the pri- 
vatization of state property into the hands of the old nomenklatura 
characterize the new themes of "cooperation" 104 
This of course should not come as a surprise, given the shift in dis- 
course over the 1980s described above, and the tenor of discussion at 
the Roundtable Accords at which both communist and Solidarity 
economists agreed that market reform was essential. 1°5 There were dis- 
agreements over how radical the shock to the economy had to be, but 
there were no major differences about the direction of the economic 
reform. But as the rest of Eastern Europe broke away from commu- 
nism, the race was on to get away from the system's economy. 
In one important sense, Hungary was in the lead from the beginning. 
Hungary's second economy and cadre of "socialist enterpreneurs" was 
probably better developed than any other Soviet-type society, 1°6 and if 
the formation of a domestic middle class of entrepreneurs is essential 
for the making of transition (as most sociologists from Eastern Europe 
today argue), Hungary has then the best social infrastructure. It has also 
developed a better array of financial institutions that convey the 
impression of taking the lead, for instance with "simulated" stock 
exchanges, joint stock companies, and capital markets. 1°7 But Poland's 
"shock therapy" in the program for economic tranformation has re- 
ceived far more official applause and attention from the West. 
The program for reform, under the authorship of Leszek Balcerowicz, 
was designed first to stabilize the economy and then institutionalize a 
complete privatization and marketization of the economy. The first 
stage was concerned above all with balancing the state budget and 
bringing the official rate of exchange closer to the black market one. In 
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the second, more dramatic stage, on 1 January 1990 prices on most 
goods and services were liberalized while wage increases were severely 
limited. This led to high inflation (79% in January) initially, but by 
March inflation was down to 5%. Poland has also made the privatiza- 
tion of its largest firms a priority. 1°8 For these indicators of financial 
progress and promises of property reform, the Paris Club in the spring 
of 1991 forgave 50% of the debts owed by Poland to member govern- 
ments (close to $33 billion) and when Lech Walesa visited the United 
States, President Bush announced an even higher percentage to be for- 
given by the U.S. government with 70% (but only S 3.8 billon), subject 
to a favorable review of Poland's reforms by the International Mone- 
tary Fund. Thus, even while foreign investment has fallen far short of 
most economists' anticipations in all of Eastern Europe, attention to 
the West's principles and standards of economic reform does pay off, at 
least for Poland. Given the assurances that Poland is a special case and 
such debt reductions are not to be repeated, we might say that Poland 
has won at least this leg of the race. 
This shift in East European politics, away from overthrowing the com- 
munists and toward instead a race toward actually existing capitalism, 
reflects important changes in the East European intelligentsia, and has 
had important consequences for them too. 
Unlike their reaction to communism, which the East European intelli- 
gentsia always treated as an unnatural Soviet imposition on their life- 
worlds, the intelligentsia by and large has come to accept actually exist- 
ing capitalism as the only alternative for Eastern Europe. They are 
tired of utopias and they want, as Konrfid wrote about civil society, 
only what the West already has. And for that they look to their own 
intellectual representative of Westernization: the professional. The role 
of the intelligentsia, while remaining considerable in the transition to a 
post-communist order, is thus tranformed. In particular, those with 
legal and economic expertise will assume a new importance in design- 
ing the framework within which the alternative will be constructed. 
Economists and lawyers, rather than historians and journalists, will 
become the intellectual notables. For intellectuals without such claims 
to competence, they will be assured of continuing leadership only inso- 
far as they become, on the one hand, members of a new middle entre- 
preneurial class, as software designers or new manager entrepreneurs, 
or on the other hand, as professional politicians in alliance with, or 
maybe even subordinate to, domestic and especially international capi- 
tal. Thus, while the structure of the Soviet-type system moved the intel- 
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ligentsia to opposition and the first post-communist authority, the new 
roles expected of them will undermine the teleological distinction and 
power of their class. 
The East European intelligentsia thus has not established its own 
authority, but rather has subordinated its authority to that of the larger 
world system into which it hopes to fit its country. To find the new 
investors and new markets, to have debt forgiven and new aid pro- 
vided, the new political leaders of post-communism must convince the 
international community of their competence. The intelligentsia's new 
task thus is different from their old aim. Formerly, dependent on their 
own and their countryls resources, they designed and executed a poli- 
tics suitable to social and systemic transformation. In the future, they 
no longer establish the aim or the design. Rather, they must now adapt 
their system to a larger system constructed by others, if they are to win 
the resources controlled by those outside Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, I argue against this being the end of the story, which a 
return to "normalcy" would suggest for an essay on Soviet-type socie- 
ties. The alternativity of Eastern Europe's futures is still too great to 
believe that markets will bring properity and democracy, and that the 
intelligentsia will become good professionals and give up their aspira- 
tions for a leading role in the making of Eastern European society. 
The alternative futures of the post communist system 
The future of Eastern Europe depends, I should like to argue, on four 
analytically distinct but related conditions: 1) the restoration of a class 
project for the intelligentsia; 2) the militance of labor; 3) the degree to 
which exclusive nationalist politics becomes a significant social force; 
and 4) a society's integration into Europe, not only economically, but 
politically and socially. In this final section, I focus my remarks on 
Poland, given that its alternativity is most highly developed. 
Although actually existing communism was, as I argued above, antago- 
nistic to the interests of the intelligentsia and especially its ideology of 
the autonomous intellectual, I still believe that it could have become the 
class project of the intelligentsia. Instead, in opposition to the Soviet- 
type system, the restoration of civil society became the new project, 
universal in its claims, but certainly articulated most forcefully by intel- 
lectuals. Although it was the articulation of a democratic civil society, 
the intelligentsia could claim to be its leading force, but once that civil 
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society was marketized, as it was over the 1980s, the intelligentsia 
could not remain its motor. The entrepreneur and private capital be- 
came the new agent of social transformation. This was apparent al- 
ready before 1989, but has certainly become obvious in the ideology of 
the post-communist regime. The material interests of the old commu- 
nist-made intelligentsia cannot be satisfied with the new system. The 
old system produced too many engineers and probably too many 
humanists and historians and writers for the new system to absorb. It 
produced too many old-style managers. It did not produce the kind of 
professional needed today. A whole new expertise is required for the 
new capitalist system in statu nascendi and only a small portion of the 
old intelligentsia will find a place. 
We have not seen any new ideology up to defending the intelligentsia 
(or the rest of society for that matter) from the market-based civil 
society. This is based not only on a lack of imagination, but also more 
fundamentally on a lack of resources to do it. Most East Europeans 
know where the resources are in the world system today, and a desper- 
ate move to get a share of that Western aid is the main concern for 
most. But I think it will be only a matter of time before a significant 
portion of the old intelligentsia recognizes that the emergent system 
can afford only a small portion of their class, even in transformed roles. 
There will be temptation then to develop a new project that will implic- 
itly claim more for a wider number of their lot. What  that project will 
be depends on a variety of other conditions, the most important of 
which will probably be the militance of labor, which actually existing 
Solidarity will do little to foster. 
The contest between Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Walesa for the 
presidency of Poland, 1°9 begun much before the official campaign, il- 
lustrates the potential chasm between any East European government 
and labor. Walesa positioned himself, while Mazowiecki was Prime 
Minister, as the common Pole, critical of those leftist and not entirely 
Polish eggheads in Warsaw)~0 But even while positioning himself as the 
worker, Walesa would not encourage or even defend strikes, given how 
that would resonate in the international financial community. An essen- 
tial part of the reform program was the need to enforce wage discipline. 
Thus, no matter who comes to power, if they wish western aid, which 
the search for debt forgiveness was, extraordinary resistance to strikes 
is essential. The danger, of course, is that further labor militance could 
move the state to a more authoritarian stand. 
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The growing number of strikes and work stoppages by industrial and 
transport workers has not been led by Solidarity activists therefore, and 
if so, certainly not with the blessing of the national organization. In 
contrast, these mobilizations are led by the post-PZPR union of Alfred 
Miodowicz, and by various Solidarity splinter groups including one led 
by Marian Jurczyk called Solidarity '80, and one more recently led by 
the inspiration of the summer 1980 Gdafisk shipyard strike, Anna 
Walentynowicz. Perhaps even more dangerous are the protests and 
road blockades led by Poland's farmers legitimately fearful of what fur- 
ther costs of market transition will bring onto them. 
Conditions for the rise of anti-market movements in Hungary rather 
than Poland are advantaged by two factors. First, the leftist tradition is 
in a slightly stronger position. Indeed, while in the spring of 1990 the 
Polish post-communist left won less than 1% of seats nationwide in 
local elections, the Hungarian left won nearly 10% in its national con- 
test. Second, and far more important, the old Hungarian trade union 
apparatus does not have the problem of an "independent" and 
"patriotic" union movement with which to compete. Solidarity activists 
today are much more sympathetic to the governmental program than 
are Miodowicz's activists, and thus are not only refraining from mobili- 
zing strikes, but actively discouraging them. Nevertheless, Hungary's 
poorer record in workers' organization and militance suggests that 
Hungary's popular classes may take the same road to survival that they 
have in the past: working in the second economy even harder than they 
have in the past, TM and Poland's workers may take their old road, but 
this time in post-PZPR unions or Solidarity splinter groups. 
To this point, few from the center of Poland's intelligentsia have moved 
to embrace these expressions of resistance to the new policies. But 
given the intensity of conflict at the center, it seems quite likely that 
some kind of new elite organic intellectuals will emerge from the fray, 
join the local intellectuals and popular classes, to articulate a new 
vision. But what kind? One likely and readily available ideology is a 
nationalist one. 
As foreign capital and wealthy foreigners enter the East European life- 
worlds in ever greater numbers, the basis for a xenophobic and nativist 
reaction is laid. Whether or not that passion is kindled depends on 
other factors, the combination of which is again probably greater in 
Poland. 
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First, the ruling Party controls nationalist politics better in Hungary 
than in Poland. The Hungarian Democratic Forum is much better 
situated than Solidarity to contain xenophobic expressions, espe- 
cially as Poland's major and fundamentalist nationalist movements 
come from outside of Poland's main Solidarity camp, with Leszek 
Moczulski's Confederation for an Independent Poland and Marek 
Jurek's Christian Nationalist Union as examples. So, to take the turf 
from these outside groups, Solidarity's own nationalist efforts must 
become more explicit. The Hungarian Democratic Forum need not be 
so aggressive in proving its patriotic roots. 
Walesa main intellectual supporters, Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczyriski, 
emerged from relative obscurity in Solidarity's illegal days to become 
the leading force in a new party most clearly aiming to consolidate 
nationalist claims. During the founding meeting of this Christian 
Democratic Party, J. Kaczyfiski said that theirs was like any other 
European Christian Democratic Party, except insofar as there was no 
need for such radical separations from the Church. The influence of the 
Catholic Church in national politics is becoming more obvious, especi- 
ally with nary a major politician expressing much resistance to the 
Church's drive to restrict or even make abortion illegal. The promi- 
nence of this national religious institution becomes yet another force 
moving Poland's politics to authoritarian nationalism. With the Catho- 
lic institutional structure, and more importantly, in its informal influ- 
ence, a revival of Polish authoritarianism may thus have an added 
impetus. 
Finally, because Poland's political culture has not abandoned the vision 
of the great Polish state and still considers the interwar dictator Gener- 
al Pilsudski with unusual reverence, military authoritarianism remains 
available in the toolkit of Polish nationalism to a degree much unlike 
Hungary. In summary, should economic transition in Poland produce 
too much resistance, an iron fist may not prove too alien a strategy. 
A renewed class project for the declassed East European intelligentsia 
could then emerge alongside this new strong state. It could be based on 
the rebuilding of state administration with non-communist cadre. It 
would likely involve support for, on the one hand, a mixed economy 
that could subsidize a public sector where Poland's surplus intelligent- 
sia and workers could still get jobs and, on the other, an educational 
system that privileges the arts and humanities in the way the old system 
did. Unlike the old system, small-scale market activity would likely be 
68 
permissible and restraints on civil liberties less formally developed. 
Gouldner writes that intellectuals are at the center of such nationalist 
movements throughout the world, but "after that phase is secured," it 
tends to become internationalist. 1~2 Certainly the establishment of an 
independent state was described by most East Europeans as the culmi- 
nation of the nationalist project, but given the harshness of economic 
transition and the descent of the "golden curtain" to replace the iron 
one, nationalism is likely not a project easily completed. An alternative 
class project for the East Central European intelligentsia might thus be 
a revisited nationalism along the lines of the inter-war third road strat- 
egy. While this may not be dangerous in Hungary, given the decline of 
militant nationalism, Poland's conditions and legacy might lead to a 
less benign project. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to inter-war Eastern Europe, East European's 
new democracies have another condition that militates against nation- 
alist dictatorship in favor of a new international democracy, and one 
that might become an alternative class project of the intelligentsia. 
Had the Mazowiecki government remained in power, I believe that the 
European identity the democratic intelligentsia worked so hard to cul- 
tivate in the days of dissidence would have lost out to the more chau- 
vinistic nationalism that finds in the introduction of foreign capital onto 
Polish soil confirmation that European identification is a poor substi- 
tute for old-style nationalism. Now that the old opposition intelligentsia 
is back in the opposition, the chances for an alternative and more 
democratic critique of transition will emerge. This is already apparent 
in the incipient alliance between the Mazowiecki supporters in Ruch 
Obywatelski - Alternatywa Demokratyczna, (the Citizen's Movement 
- Democratic Alternative) and the new group called Solidarnogd Pracy, 
or Solidarity of Labor. This alliance might be positioned best to make 
the crucial connection between workers' defense and Poland's Euro- 
pean identity. 
To the extent Eastern Europe can rejoin Europe not just on the basis of 
market or heritage but also on the basis of political ties, the democracy 
associated with Solidarity of 1980-81 has a better chance of survival. 
Membership in the European Community can give workers access to a 
political institution that might give them greater leverage that their own 
peripheral or semi-peripheral state simply cannot wield in the face of 
capital's mobility. It could also give them possibilities for jobs that labor 
migration within the Community would allow. More relevant here, it 
can reflect a class project of the intelligentsia. 
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Zygmunt Bauman argues] 13 correctly in my view, that the rationalizing 
intrusive state of modernity creates the space for modern intellectuals 
by inviting them to provide a culture that legitimates that state's inter- 
vention into new spheres of social life. But once state and culture are so 
constructed, the general intellectual recedes in importance, and might 
retreat either to a relatively privileged life of autonomy (the independ- 
ent intellectual), become the interpreter for cultures not represented by 
the logic of state power (the organic intellectual), or become a servant 
of bureaucratic power (a professional or technocrat). The European 
Community, the construction of a new administrative level above 
states, offers the next great opportunity for the intellectuals' claim to 
power. It provides a new site for intellectuals' employment, in the ad- 
ministrative and regulatory commissions that become available. But 
perhaps even more dramatically, it gives intellectuals a new kind of 
power in the opportunity to legislate a new community of nations and 
individuals. I believe too that this is probably the intelligentsia class 
project that will most facilitate the retention, or expansion, of democra- 
cy, but an elaboration of this argument will have to be made in another 
article. 
In conclusion, it appears that the Soviet-type system's emancipatory 
alternative of civil society depends not only on East European identifi- 
cation with the European heritage, but also on its political integration 
into the European Community. Not only would the East benefit from 
the West's wealth, but both could benefit from the common purpose 
that might be constructed in their collaboration. Simply, European po- 
litical integration might give to the civil societies of Eastern Europe new 
potential allies that make democracy, and not only capitalism, a greater 
certainty. The European Community may then be the best political 
ambition for Gouldner's "flawed universal class" in Eastern Europe. 
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